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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Since the federal funds rate reached the zero lower bound in late 2008, economists have 
been struggling to adapt their models to a long-term zero rate. Wu and Xia built upon previous 
research by Fischer Black to create a model for how the federal funds rate behaves during the 
ZLB period. In their model, the rate actually dips into the negative digits, which the actual 
federal funds rate does not do. The logic behind the model is that a negative shadow rate is a 
much better indicator of true economic conditions while the current zero rate merely masks the 
actual economic reality. It is also easier to use the shadow rate for trend analysis purposes, since 
the shadow rate is flexible and changes while the federal funds rate remains artificially fixed at 
zero. Thus, this paper seeks to provide a comparison between the Shadow Rate, as defined by 
Wu and Xia, and how three key banking variables (leverage, profitability, and non-performing 
loans to total loans) react in response to the shadow rate, along with three control variables: real 
GDP growth, inflation, and the current account to GDP ratio. Regression will also be used to 
determine how three key borrower variables (S&P 500 Index, Credibility Consumer Distress 
Index, and the ratio of nonfinancial corporate business debt securities to total assets) interact 
with the shadow rate and the three control variables previously mentioned. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis will employ regression to determine how three key banking variables 
(leverage, profitability, and non-performing loans to total loans) react in response to the shadow 
rate, along with three control variables: real GDP growth, inflation, and the current account to 
GDP ratio. Regression will also be used to determine how three key borrower variables (S&P 
500 Index, Credibility Consumer Distress Index, and the ratio of nonfinancial corporate business 
debt securities to total assets) interact with the shadow rate and the three control variables 
previously mentioned. 
The independent effects of the interaction between lenders and borrowers have an 
important impact on the economy as a whole, and do influence the direction of monetary policy, 
as told by Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and Bernanke and Blinder (1988). The reason this 
research is important is because of importance of the credit channel, which is outlined by the 
academics previously noted.   
Since the US entered the ZLB period, credit channel literature has seen a decline, 
however, it is the opinion of the author that much of the literature on the credit channel can still 
be highly useful in determining macroeconomic effects of monetary policy even during the ZLB 
period, and should not be ignored. To the knowledge of this author, this is one of the first theses 
at the undergraduate level that attempts to measure the effect of the Wu-Xia (2009) shadow rate 
against borrower and lender variables to determine if there exists any correlation. However, prior 
to getting into the exact methodology and formal analysis of this paper, a brief discussion 
regarding the Fed and how it operates is necessary.  
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For many individuals, the day-to-day operations of the United States Federal Reserve 
Bank belong to the realm of the unknown. Actions that this formidable institution takes are 
supposedly only understood by a small handful of economists and bankers who, through their 
superior knowledge of the system, are able to manipulate it in order to conduct what is known as 
monetary policy. What can perhaps make things even more confusing for someone just 
beginning a study of economics is how something called the federal funds rate (FFR) dictates 
inflation, along with other macroeconomic conditions.  
This work thus seeks to act as a brief introduction into the nuts and bolts of monetary 
policy related to the FFR, with a particular emphasis on something known as the “shadow rate,” 
which those familiar with the topic know, is an estimated rate that some argue is a better 
indication of true economic conditions during the zero-lower bound period (ZLB).  
It was initially believed that a central bank that could control money supply would also 
be able to control boom-bust cycles.1 The manipulation of monetary policy was believed to give 
policy makers an additional weapon for fighting recessions and run-away inflation. To some 
extent, the Federal Reserve has done its job, with the Great Depression being a formidable 
exception to the rule.2  
In recent years, the financial news has been filled with speculation in regards to whether 
or not the Federal Reserve will end up raising interest rates.3 This sort of speculation has not 
                                                        
1 Sowell, Thomas. Basic Economics: A Common Sense Guide to the Economy. 1st ed. Vol. 5. New York:  
Basic, 2015. Print.  
 
2 Bernanke, Ben. The Courage to Act: A Memoir of a Crisis and Its Aftermath. New York, NY: W. W.  
Norton, 2015. Print.  
 
3 Hilsenrath, John. "Fed Sets Stage for Rate Hikes in 2015." Wsj.com. Wall Street Journal. 10 Feb. 2016 
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been unique only to the US. Central banks in Europe and Canada have also lowered their rates 
into the zero-lower bound (ZLB), prompting many economists to question the long-term benefits 
of such an action.4 
 In the initial period of the 2008 financial crisis (now aptly titled “The Great Recession”), 
economists were all unanimous in calling for lower interest rates coupled with increased 
government spending in order to stimulate the economy.5 The rationale behind this idea made 
sense: if interest rates were lowered, people would be willing to borrow more, and thus invest 
more. This of course, is a very simplistic way of looking at the situation, especially since many 
people became so risk-averse to borrowing during this period that lower rates would have little 
impact on their outlook.  
 Since lowering interest rates were only a first step in tackling the economic problems 
facing the US in 2008, the Fed had to resort to a combination of unconventional monetary policy 
tools. These included the use of forward guidance, targeted-asset purchases (TARP), and 
quantitative easing (QE).6 The Fed lowered rates in December 2008, and then in their first 2009 
FOMC statement stated that the rates would remain low for the foreseeable future.7  
                                                        
4 Burnham, Terry. "The Real Financial Monster: Low Interest Rates." The Huffington Post.  
TheHuffingtonPost.com. Web. 9 Feb. 2016.  
 
5 Chidley, Joe. “A voice in the wilderness: Paul Krugman on why Economists Misread the Financial Crisis  
and why the US still needs more Stimulus.” Canadian Business 2009: 48. Academic OneFile.  
Web. 10 Feb. 2016. 
 
6 Cecchetti, Stephen G., and Kermit L. Schoenholtz. Money, Banking, and Financial Markets. McGraw  
Hill, 2014. Print.  
 
7 Hilsenrath, John. "Fed Cuts Rates Near Zero to Battle Slump." Wsj.com. Wall Street Journal, 17 Dec.  
2008. Web. 04 Nov. 2015.  
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 This is important to note because once the federal funds rate reached the ZLB, the Fed 
still continued its buying up of toxic assets from failing institutions. The economy also began a 
slow, but steady rebound. However, this recovery presented a relatively unique problem for 
economists studying monetary policy. Since the rates reached zero, many macroeconomic 
models failed to accurately predict future economic conditions in the country.   
 It must also be noted that keeping rates at such a low threshold for extended periods of 
time can be dangerous for an economy. Such a policy does not work if banks borrow form the 
Fed but then refuse to lend the money out, or if not enough people continue to borrow from 
banks. This can ultimately cause deflation and a lack of spending, which can hurt the economy.  
Furthermore, because the rate is in the ZLB, economic empirical models that rely on the 
federal funds rate as an input variable are no longer accurate. To draw a parallel, think of having 
to solve complex mathematical equations, but possessing a calculator on which only the number 
zero worked. You would not be able to solve any complex calculation using that calculator if you 
could only input one variable.  
 To solve for this apparent conundrum, economists began using what is now known as a 
“shadow rate.” This was essentially a statistical estimate, based on current economic conditions, 
of what the federal funds rate ought to be. Wu and Xia (year), formulated the basis for the 
shadow rate that will be used in this thesis, they based their rate on a wide array of 
macroeconomic indicators and found that for the past several months, the rate has actually been 
in the negative digits. If the actual rate were so low, it would mean that you would actually be 
paying to keep your money in a bank, as opposed to receiving an interest on your deposit. 
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Since empirical models that study the impact of monetary policy require a variable for the 
federal funds rate that is not zero, Wu and Xia’s shadow rate will be used as opposed to the FFR 
when comparing it to the lending and borrower aspects of the credit channel. The next step lies in 
determining whether using an artificial rate can actually tell us anything about changing 
economic conditions.  
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Building upon previous research on the credit channel, this thesis seeks to determine how 
lenders (banks) and borrowers are affected under the Wu-Xia (2009) shadow rate. According to 
Bernanke & Gertler (1995), the credit channel is something of a misnomer because it is not 
necessarily an independent channel, but rather a “set of factors that amplify and propagate 
conventional interest rate effects.”8 This means that throughout this thesis we will not be 
discussing the credit channel as an independent channel of the monetary transmission 
mechanism, but rather as the enhancer that Bernanke & Gertler spoke about. 
 It has been argued by researchers that it is difficult to measure monetary policy shocks to 
the economy using conventional interest rate models, and it is here that the credit channel can 
help fill in the gaps, so to speak. The conditions of banks in accordance to bank variables as well 
as the relative well-being of borrowers, can also help fill in these gaps.  
 According to Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), short term borrowing rises subsequently to a 
monetary policy tightening. This is interesting to point out, because in the case of this particular 
thesis, low interest rates have been coupled with an expansionary monetary policy, which does 
not fall in line with traditional economic theory. However, during the start of the 2008 recession, 
short term borrowing decreased, which is exactly what Gertler and Gilchrist predicted. However, 
the 2008 housing crash helped economists better understand the fragile relationship between 
lenders and borrowers, which was previously not as emphasized in Credit Channel literature. 
                                                        
8 Bernanke, Ben S., and Mark Gertler. "Inside the Black Box: The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy  
Transmission." Journal of Economic Perspectives 9.4 (1995): 27-48. Web. 10 Nov. 2015. 
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 It is important to note that the Credit Channel as we know it, and the literature that seeks 
to understand it, has undergone important changes since Bernanke and others initially wrote 
about it in the 1990s. Other newer studies that were performed in the aftermath of the Great 
Recession are noteworthy because they account for the large housing market shock that occurred 
in 2008. For example, prior to the 2008 housing crisis, it was assumed that bank lending was not 
one of the key factors affecting the monetary transmission mechanism.9 A recent working paper 
for the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) found that banks “with weaker core capital 
positions…restricted the loan supply more strongly during the crisis period.”10 It was also argued 
that this action further exacerbated the recessionary effects of the period.  
 The paper further used this evidence to support the idea that the Basel III Accords were 
correct in focusing on bank capital, on “funding liquidity risks,” and utilizing a more forward 
looking approach when creating new macroprudential regulation.  
Another 2015 paper by Ciccarelli, Maddaloni, and Peydro found that:  
“the credit channel amplifies a monetary policy shock on GDP and prices 
through the balance-sheets of households, firms and banks. For corporate 
loans, amplification is highest through the bank lending and the 
borrower’s balance sheet channel; for households, demand is the strongest 
channel.”11 
                                                        
9 Gambacorta, Leonardo, and David Marques-Ibanez. "The Bank Lending Channel: Lessons from the Crisis." BIS  
Working Papers (2014). Web. 05 Apr. 2016.  
 
10 Gambacorta, Leonardo, and David Marques-Ibanez. "The Bank Lending Channel: Lessons from the Crisis." BIS  
Working Papers (2014). Web. 05 Apr. 2016.  
 
11 Ciccarelli, Matteo, Angela Maddaloni, and Jose-Luis Peydro. “Trusting the Bankers: A New Look at the Credit  
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This is quite a shift in tone from previous academic papers, as both lenders and borrowers 
are now seen as being potential sources of monetary policy shocks, whereas previously, they 
were only seen as risk-enhancers.   
Lenders and borrowers themselves operate within the Credit Channel. Since interest rates 
are known to affect borrowers and lenders, and in turn, loans the frequency of their repayment, I 
am interested in finding out if the shadow rate can be substituted for the Federal Funds rate 
during the ZLB.   
When creating the framework for their model of the shadow rate, Wu and Xia used the 
shadow rate term structure model (SRTSM) which was first proposed by economist Fisher Black 
(1995).12 In his research, the idea was to extract shadow rates which can become negative and 
were “driven by the dynamics of the term structure of interest rates.”13 His shadow rate model 
was unconstrained by the ZLB and appeared to mirror market expectations of short term nominal 
interest rates. However, many other factors besides changes in interest rate policy can affect the 
outcome of expectations, such as “longer-term growth prospects and changes in short-run market 
sentiments.”14 
                                                        
Channel of Monetary Policy.” Review of Economic Dynamis 18.4 (2015): 979-1002. EconLit. Web. 15 
Apr. 2016 
 
12 Xia, Fan. "The Term Structure of Interest Rates, Monetary Policy, and Macroeconomy." Order No.  
3630527 University of California, San Diego, 2014. Ann Arbor: ProQuest. Web. 10 Nov. 2015. 
 
13 Lombardi, Marco, and Feng Zhu. "A Shadow Policy Rate to Calibrate US Monetary Policy at the Zero Lower  
Bound." BIS Working Papers. Web. 05 Apr. 2016.  
 
14 Lombardi, Marco, and Feng Zhu. "A Shadow Policy Rate to Calibrate US Monetary Policy at the Zero Lower  
Bound." BIS Working Papers. Web. 05 Apr. 2016. 
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 The Wu-Xia shadow rate, although not perfect by any means, does attempt to account for 
some of these non-interest rate policy factors in their rate, which was a major factor in my 
decision to use it in my own model.  
Wu-Xia built on the Black (1995) model by using a simple factor-augmented vector 
autoregression (FAVAR), which showed that the calculated shadow rate exhibited dynamic 
correlations with both the federal funds rate and key macro variables, which included variables 
relating to the dissemination of credit.15 This essentially means that the shadow rate in their 
model could be estimated using both traditional macroeconomic indicators (such as GDP and 
inflation) and consequently was directly related to both: this was different than the Black (1995) 
SRTSM which almost focused exclusively on interest rate policy when computing the shadow 
rate. Thus, when the funds rate was artificially stuck at zero, the Wu-Xia shadow rate still moved 
in response to other macro variables. 
Another key aspect to note about the Wu-Xia shadow rate is that the shadow rate will not 
be accurate in the ZLB unless the data set spans the pre-ZLB period. This is an important 
distinction, because it implies that any numerical value of the shadow rate is dependent on a slew 
of data that occurred before a ZLB period. This will means that future researchers will not be 
able to use Wu and Xia’s model during an isolated ZLB period.16 
Despite its inability to be examine the ZLB period in isolation, Wu and Xia’s model 
made a great contribution to the field of economics in presenting a long-term estimate of the 
                                                        
15 Wu, Jing Cynthia and Xia, Fan Dora. “Measuring the Macroeconomic Impact of Monetary Policy at the  
Zero Lower Bound. May 18, 2015. Chicago Booth Research. Paper No. 13-77. 
 
16 Wu, Jing Cynthia and Xia, Fan Dora. “Measuring the Macroeconomic Impact of Monetary Policy at the  
Zero Lower Bound. May 18, 2015. Chicago Booth Research. Paper No. 13-77. 
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shadow rate that, unlike other works in the field did not have unexplained gaps. For example, 
Bauer and Rudebusch (2013) do not account for the ZLB period, but do provide better forecasts 
and better interest rate fit than Wu-Xia, according to a 2014 BIS working paper.17 In other 
words, the Wu-Xia rate model did not have to readjust its parameters during consecutive time 
periods in order to retain its accuracy. The trend of the shadow rate is fairly consistent with 
economic conditions and can thus act as a suitable replacement for the federal funds rate when 
using other empirical economic models. This is exactly the reason why I will be using the rate by 
Wu and Xia as opposed to other models.  
Below is a visual representation of what the shadow rate, according to Wu and Xia, is 
estimated to be from 2003 to 2016.   
Figure 1: Wu-Xia Shadow Federal Funds Rate 
 
 One can clearly see that the shadow rate (represented by the green line) perfectly mirrors 
the federal funds rate (represented by the blue line) until approximately the end of 2008. This is 
                                                        
17 http://www.bis.org/publ/work452.pdf 
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precisely when monetary policy entered the so-called zero-lower bound: the exact date is 
Tuesday, December 15, 2008.18 Here, we see economic conditions indicating the shadow rate 
being higher than the federal funds rate. Then, midway through 2009, when the Federal Reserve 
stated in their FOMC report that rates would remain near zero for the foreseeable future, the 
shadow rate dipped into negative territory. 
It is interesting to note that the shadow rate behaved like traditional economists predicted 
the federal funds rate should have behaved under similar economic conditions. If the Fed were to 
conduct monetary policy solely mirroring current economic conditions, they would inadvertently 
have lowered rates into negative territory midway through 2009 in order to stimulate spending. 
The rationale is that in an economy suffering from excess saving (people are afraid of losing 
their money so they save instead of spend) is in danger of entering what Bernanke called a 
“savings glut.” This in turn can lead to what Paul Krugman termed a “liquidity trap,” where 
monetary policy fails to have any effect on the economy, and thus policy makers lose their 
ability to combat worsening conditions.19 
 Yet, none of those things happened despite the Fed pursuing a highly aggressive 
monetary policy. Strangely enough, the money supply increased, debt to GDP increased 
significantly (from 41% in 2008 to 74% today), but inflation remained relatively constant.20 This 
                                                        
18 Hilsenrath, John. "Fed Cuts Rates Near Zero to Battle Slump." Wsj.com. Wall Street Journal, 17 Dec.  
2008. Web. 04 Nov. 2015.  
 
19 Summers, Larry. "The Age of Secular Stagnation: What It Is and What to Do About It." Foreign Affairs  
95.2 (2016): 2-9. Web. 03 Mar. 2016.  
 
20 Summers, Larry. "The Age of Secular Stagnation: What It Is and What to Do About It." Foreign Affairs  
95.2 (2016): 2-9. Web. 03 Mar. 2016.  
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is surprising because according to traditional monetary policy, an increase in money supply 
should drive inflation up. Yet, the US has kept interest rates near zero for nearly 7 years now, 
and inflation has remained constant the entire time!  
 This lack of growth seems to have been expected by the Fed. The last FOMC report of 
2008 traditionally recognized the second pillar of the dual mandate in regards to maximizing 
employment, but “chose to eschew the equivocal reference to stable economic growth.”21 This 
shows that the Fed was privy to not referencing growth as a precursor to stability, because they 
knew it would not be achieved in the near future.  
 This thesis will also show that as expected, bank balance sheet assets also increased 
during this time period. However, consumer assets, although they increased, did not increase by 
nearly the same amount as those assets held by banks. Consumer propensity to borrow has also 
significantly declined. This is interesting to point out because it shows that large banks benefitted 
more from the zero rates than regular individuals have. The newly imposed mortgage 
regulations, particularly on those seeking to refinance their mortgages, have become so stringent 
in the wake of the 2008 crisis that even former Fed chairman Ben Bernanke was denied an 
application to refinance his mortgage in 2014!22 
 This is the sort of thing one cannot make up. Yet, this further leads credence to the old 
maxim that too much of a good thing (in this case regulation) is indeed bad (over-regulation). In 
                                                        
21 Jackson, Laura E. "Monetary Policy in a Zero Lower Bound Environment." University of North  
Carolina Phd Submission (2014): 1-91. Web. 10 Nov. 2016.  
 
22 Campbell, Elizabeth, and Lorraine Woellert. "You Know It's a Tough Market When Bernanke Can't  
Refinance." Bloomberg.com. Bloomberg, 3 Oct. 2014. Web. 20 Mar. 2016.  
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this particular case, excess regulation in regards to receiving real estate loans actually harmed the 
every-day consumer more than the largest real estate conglomerates.  
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METHODOLOGY 
 The main scope of this thesis is to determine how lenders and borrowers react to changes 
in the Wu-Xia (2009) shadow rate. This section will cover the methodology used in creating a 
model that will allow for comparison between these variables, as well as a description of each of 
the variables and why they are significant.  
 The shadow rate will act as the main variable studied, and is significant because it allows 
us to look at the ZLB period without having an artificially fixed rate. The shadow rate data was 
acquired from the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta website on a monthly basis. To adjust the 
rate to fit the model, the mean for every three months was found and then adjusted to a quarterly 
rate. The difference between each quarter was then found in order to give the quarterly change 
and it is these variables that are used in the regression analysis. For the pre-2009 period, since 
there was no shadow rate provided in the data, the ratio of the quarterly federal funds rates was 
compared to the ratio of the shadow rate, and the unknown shadow rate variables were solved 
for. This is how I was able to craft a shadow rate for the pre-ZLB period. 
All the data used in the study was obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
website. As mentioned previously, variables related to banks and variables related to borrowers 
are contrasted with the shadow rate in this model. The three control variables used in this study 
are Real GDP Growth, inflation, and the current account to GDP ratio. Control variables are 
variables that are held constant and used in the model in order to clarify the relationship between 
two principal variables. 
As such, the regression will take on the following format: 
xt = β0 + β1 (Shadow Rate)t + λCt + εt 
15 
 
Where xt is the lender or borrower variable being regressed, β1 (Shadow Rate)t is the shadow 
rate, the control variables are shown here by the λCt, while εt is the error term.  
The control variables are shown here by the λCt. Historically the Federal Reserve has 
acted in response to GDP and inflation, because of their dual mandate targeting both growth and 
inflation. Fed policymaking is also affected by exchange rates, trade, and foreign borrowing, 
which is why I used the current account to GDP ratio, because I want to control for all of these 
things in my regression.  
Real GDP Growth is significant because it offers a broad look at how the United States 
economy has performed in recent years: it was calculated as a percent change from the preceding 
quarter. Inflation, also a good indicator of economic conditions because it directly relates to 
purchasing power and prices of goods, was found using the Consumer Price Index. The CPI 
Index is a measure of the average change (over time) in the prices paid by consumers for a 
market basket of consumer goods and services.23 The CPI numbers were then presented as a 
percent change from the previous quarter. The current account to GDP ratio measures the current 
account surplus or deficit as a percentage of GDP, and then presented as the change from 
previous quarter.  
The banking variables used were leverage, profitability, and non-performing loans to 
total loans. According to Beltratti and Palladino (2015), bank leverage is a key determinant of 
bank profitability, and in their work have formed a GMM-econometric model that determined 
that equity is positively related to residual income. They also show how liquidity is positively 
                                                        
23 "Consumer Price Index." Bureau of Labor Statistics. Web. 6 Apr. 2016.  
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related to equity, and thus prove there exists a relationship between the two.24 Bank leverage is 
also impacted by the shadow rate, because interest rate changes affect a bank’s ability to lend. If 
the shadow rate goes up, then it is expected that a bank’s leverage will increase, because it 
becomes harder for them to find funding.  
The traditional manner of calculating leverage (debt/equity) was eschewed because 
equity is more volatile, and total assets includes equity in its calculation and is thus a better 
indicator. Leverage was then presented as a change from the previous quarter. Profitability was 
calculated as the Return on Average Assets. It is expected that the shadow rate is inversely 
related to bank profitability because the cost of funding goes up with the shadow rate, and thus 
banks make less in the process of lending out money. 
 The ratio of non-performing loans to total loans is the “ratio of defaulting loans 
(payments of interest and principal past due by 90 days or more) to total gross loans (total value 
of loan portfolio).”25 It is important to note that it doesn’t include only the unpaid portion of the 
loan, but rather the gross loan as a whole. This is a significant variable because it is a good 
indicator of the health of the commercial banking system: loan repayment is central to bank 
solvency and is thus critical to understanding the financial well-being of the banking system. It is 
expected that the shadow rate is positively related to the ratio of non-performing loans to total 
loans, because as interest rates rise, the borrower’s ability to pay back loans diminishes. 
                                                        
24 Beltratti, Andrei, and Giovanna Paladino. “Bank Leverage and Profitability: Evidence From a Sample of  
International Banks.” Review of Financial Economics (2015): 46. Academic OneFile. Web. 6 April 2016 
25 "Bank Non-Performing Loans to Gross Loans for United States." FRED. Web. 6 Apr. 2016.  
 
17 
 
 Now that the banking variables used have been outlined, it is time to move on to the 
borrower variables. The borrowing variables that will be used in the regression analysis are the 
S&P 500 index, the credibility consumer distress index, and the ratio of nonfinancial corporate 
debt securities to assets.  
 The S&P 500 index tracks the largest 500 companies in the United States, which also 
collectively make up 75% of the total equity in the country.26 The fact that they take up such a 
large portion of the market makes these companies and the index that tracks them a good 
measure for my analysis. This is the widest spanning measure that we have for the overall health 
of the economy, which is in large part, the reason for my using it in this analysis. The strength of 
the S&P 500 is an excellent indicator of the health of the nationwide economy, and by extension, 
the health of borrowers. This index will be presented as a quarterly percent change. The S&P 500 
should display an inverse relationship with the shadow rate, as firm’s health is negatively 
impacted by an increase in the shadow rate, because as bond prices go up, people tend to invest 
less. This in turn may negatively impact the health of the firms in the S&P 500, thus lowering the 
overall value of the S&P 500. 
 The Credibility Consumer Distress Index (CCDI) measures the 5 categories of personal 
finance that are purported to reflect or lead to a secure and stable financial life. These are: 
employment, housing, credit, household budget and net worth, all measured equally. The 
aggregate of these five components is then calculated and presented as a score on the index, with 
scores above 80 being stable, 70-79 indicating financial risk, and under 70 indicating instability 
                                                        
26 "S&P 500©." FRED. Web. 6 Apr. 2016.  
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and potential recession.27 The CCDI is important because if offers a glimpse into regular 
borrower households’ economic actions and motivations. In regards to the shadow rate, the 
CCDI should display a positive correlation, because if the shadow rate is a surrogate for the FFR, 
and we are not in a recessionary gap (which currently we aren’t) then an increase in the shadow 
rate would mean that economic conditions are improving, which consequently means that that 
the CCDI is increasing.  
 The final component of the borrower variables included is the ratio of nonfinancial 
corporate business debt securities to total assets. According to the FRED website, this variable 
presents “a sequence of accounts that relate production, income and spending, capital formation, 
financial transactions, and asset revaluations to changes in net worth between balance sheets for 
the major sectors of the U.S. economy.”28 This is shown as a ratio with assets in order to get a 
more comprehensive picture. It is expected that the ratio of nonfinancial corporate business debt 
securities to total assets would have an inverse relationship with the shadow rate because net 
worth goes down (S&P 500 goes down and leverage increases) when the shadow rate increases. 
 Each of the borrower and lender variables described in this section will be regressed 
against the shadow rate in order to determine if there is any statistical correlation between the 
two. The shadow rate will be available for the 2000-2015 period, as will all the other variables 
with the exception of the S&P 500 and the Consumer Credibility Distress Index, as data was not 
                                                        
27 "Credibility Consumer Distress Index (DISCONTINUED)." FRED. Web. 6 Apr. 2016. 
  
28 "Nonfinancial Corporate Business; Debt Securities; Liability, Level." FRED. Web. 6 Apr. 2016.  
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available for the entire period covered. As a result, these two variables will have fewer 
observations present in the regression analysis. 
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RESULTS.  
There are four tables below: one encompassing the shadow rate and its relationship with 
the borrower and lender variables in the 2000-2015 period, and another encompassing the 2009-
2015 period.  Afterwards, there are two more tables: on encompassing the 2000-2015 period, 
including a quarterly lag on the shadow rate variable, and another encompassing the 2009-2015 
period, including dummy variables (dummy variable was named “dumsr” in STATA) in order 
not to lose any of the pre-2009 data when regressing the results.  
 
Figure 2: 2000-2015 Regression Results 
  
Leverage 
 
Profitability 
Non-
Performing 
Loans to total 
Loans 
 
S&P 500 
 
CCDI 
 
Security/Assets 
Ratio 
Shadow Rate 6.587 
(7.330) 
-8.526 
(26.203) 
 
-6.491 
(4.360) 
 
1.874 
(3.119) 
 
-0.687 
(0.493) 
 
-11283.09 
(12462.25) 
 
Real GDP 0.276 
(0.804) 
6.612 
(12.141) 
-5.938* 
(2.020) 
3.845* 
(1.145) 
0.515** 
(0.231) 
-2748.761 
(5774.207) 
Inflation 1.141 
(1.118) 
-8.561 
(20.138) 
4.274 
(3.351) 
0.486 
(1.729) 
-0.102 
(0.382) 
1981.879 
(9577.793) 
CA/GDP 1.747 
(3.663) 
-64.266 
(43.453) 
28.245* 
(7.231) 
-9.039** 
(4.248) 
-1.802** 
(0.814) 
45028.36** 
(29509.39) 
Observations 60 60 60 27 53 60 
R2 0.199 0.062 0.536 0.6416 0.391 0.205 
Note; ( ) represent the standard error, the numbers on top of the numbers in ( ) represent the coefficients 
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Figure 3: 2009-2015 Regression Results 
  
Leverage 
 
Profitability 
Non-
Performing 
Loans to total 
Loans 
 
S&P 500 
 
CCDI 
 
Security/Assets 
Ratio 
Shadow Rate -0.187 
(2.851) 
 
404.8842 
(455.8549) 
17.791 
(53.984) 
-10.352 
(18.166) 
-2.010 
(5.948) 
 
15869.04 
(104590) 
Real GDP 0.448 
(0.427) 
5.577* 
(41.074) 
 
-0.269 
(4.864) 
-0.353** 
(1.637) 
-0.116** 
(0.457) 
-3390.932 
(9423.844) 
Inflation -0.340 
(0.593) 
-64.345 
(66.884) 
-4.488** 
(7.921) 
1.692 
(2.665) 
0.153 
(0.749) 
-9843.204 
(38391.99) 
CA/GDP -1.606 
(1.944) 
-213.621* 
(167.928) 
43.295 
(19.816) 
-13.678 
(6.668) 
-5.493* 
(2.372) 
-26485.73 
(38391.99) 
Observations 24 24 24 24 20 24 
R2 0.132 0.250 0.617 0.668 0.738 0.048 
Note; ( ) represent the robust standard error, the numbers on top of the numbers in ( ) represent the coefficients. * 
represents a statistical significance of 0.01, ** of 0.05, and *** of 0.10 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: 2000-2015 Regression Results (Lagged) 
  
Leverage 
 
Profitability 
Non-
Performing 
Loans to total 
Loans 
 
S&P 500 
 
CCDI 
 
Security/Assets 
Ratio 
Shadow Rate -0.542 
(0.501) 
 
-18.944 
(32.282) 
-0.719** 
(4.171) 
-10.352 
(18.166) 
-2.010 
(5.948) 
 
-6236.186 
(14255) 
Real GDP 0.116 
(0.201) 
6.84 
(12.945) 
 
-5.398* 
(1.672) 
2.126** 
(0.923) 
-0.538* 
(0.228) 
-5734.661 
(5716.117) 
Inflation -0.310 
(0.387) 
-11.799 
(24.963) 
11.618* 
(3.225) 
1.142 
(1.633) 
-0.652 
(0.443) 
867.7019 
(11022.83) 
CA/GDP -1.264*** 
(0.803) 
-85.018*** 
(51.727) 
35.231* 
(6.683) 
-3.338 
(4.04) 
-2.41* 
(0.9) 
58896.33* 
(22841.16) 
Observations 60 60 60 60 27 60 
R2 0.08 0.21 0.726 0.668 0.487 0. 48 
Note; ( ) represent the robust standard error, the numbers on top of the numbers in ( ) represent the coefficients. * 
represents a statistical significance of 0.01, ** of 0.05, and *** of 0.10 
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Figure 5: 2009-2015 Regression Results (with Dummy Variable) 
  
Leverage 
 
Profitability 
Non-
Performing 
Loans to total 
Loans 
 
S&P 500 
 
CCDI 
 
Security/Assets 
Ratio 
Shadow Rate -0.055 
(0.435) 
 
-15.584 
(26.09) 
-6.481 
(4.462) 
4.817 
(3.253) 
0.547 
(0.493) 
 
-19862.76 
(10295.13) 
Real GDP 0.077 
(0.37) 
10.786 
(12.187) 
 
-5.944* 
(1.672) 
2.977* 
(1.15) 
0.608* 
(0.234) 
2324.582 
(4808.917) 
Inflation 0.04 
(0.561) 
-9.94 
(19.806) 
4.275 
(3.388) 
-0.79 
(1.732) 
-0.159 
(0.377) 
306.781 
(7815.499) 
CA/GDP 1.303 
(0.803) 
-89.788** 
(59.121) 
28.281* 
(7.752) 
-17.703* 
(8.674) 
-2.274* 
(0.851) 
14005.69 
(17886.02) 
dumsr 
Shadow Rate 
-0.723 
(0.342) 
-11.414 
(30.19) 
-9.766 
(6.452) 
7.881 
(5.782) 
1.251 
(1.562) 
-22736.822 
(12475.148) 
dumsr  
Real GDP 
0.865 
(0.421) 
12.472 
(22.933) 
-11.453** 
(3.774) 
3.210 
(5.631) 
2.221* 
(0.873) 
4745.531 
(6064.21) 
dumsr 
Inflation 
0.09 
(0.43) 
-10.234 
(20.547) 
8.275 
(8.933) 
-1.241 
(2.318) 
-2.45 
(0.854) 
417.31 
(8860.849) 
dumsr 
CA/GDP 
0.927 
(1.629) 
-8.725*** 
(61.332) 
34.762** 
(8.301) 
-20.441 
(13.308) 
-4.451 
(1.134) 
17138.097 
(21365.443) 
Observations 60 60 60 60 27 60 
R2 0.04 0.11 0.536 0.70 0.42 0.48 
Note; ( ) represent the robust standard error, the numbers on top of the numbers in ( ) represent the coefficients. * 
represents a statistical significance of 0.01, ** of 0.05, and *** of 0.10 
The above table represents the results discovered when computing the regressions 
outlined in the Methodology section, only by also adopting a lag on the shadow rate, in order to 
achieve better results. The coefficients shown imply that with a one-point change in the shadow 
rate, the response variable moves x amount either up or down in response. For example, when 
looking at the leverage ratio, it is observed that for every 1 point change in the shadow rate, 
leverage goes down by 0.542. The standard error shown in brackets measures the accuracy with 
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which a sample represents a population. R2 is a statistical method which explains exactly how 
much of the variability of a factor is caused or explained by its relationship to another factor.29 
The p-value (denoted in the graph by the * symbol) shows whether or not a sample tests 
as being statistically significant. Traditionally, a hypothesis is rejected if the p-value is greater 
than 0.05. Inevitably, it must come to the attention of anyone reading this that none of the chosen 
lender and borrower variables actually test as being statistically significant in regards to the 
shadow rate. The closest values that appear to have some correlation to the shadow rate are non-
performing loans to total loans and the CCDI: although in the lagged 200-2015 regression, Non-
Performing Loans to total Loans tests as being statistically significant at the 5% level.  
On the other hand, there are several variables which do indeed test as being significant to 
other control variables. The current account to GDP ratio is the most consistently statistically 
significant control variable of those chosen for this study.  
There are various reasons for this result. First, the number of observations taken is 
relatively small (with the most being 56 per sample). Second, the variables chosen may be 
affected by too many other factors besides the shadow rate in order for there to appear any 
correlation in the regressions. 
For example, an index like the S&P 500 can be triggered to move by something like an 
oil crisis in Europe, or a conflict in the Middle East, or even a domestic crisis in the US (like a 
real estate crash, or high unemployment). The fact that this index is so susceptible to so many 
other variables provide some justification for why it would have little correlation with the 
shadow rate. 
                                                        
29 "What Is Coefficient of Determination (r2)? Definition and Meaning." BusinessDictionary.com. 7 April 16 
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 However, that is not to say that all of the predictions outlined in this thesis were 
erroneous. For example, the regression results did indeed show that the shadow rate has an 
inverse relationship with profitability, the ratio of nonfinancial corporate debt securities to assets 
and a positive correlation with the CCDI. Consequently, it was found that the Wu-Xia shadow 
rate and the S&P 500 were actually positively correlated, but that the shadow rate was inversely 
related to the non-performing loans to total loans ratio as well as to leverage. This is unexpected, 
but perhaps due to the small number of observations included in the regression analysis.  
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CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, the findings of this thesis do not support the idea that the lender and borrower 
variables chosen exhibit a direct correlation with the Wu-Xia (2009) shadow rate. However, this 
does not necessarily imply that there is no direct correlation between such variables and the 
shadow rate at all. In one of their recent working papers, Wu and Xia (2014) outline their use of 
impulse responses of six economic variables (policy rate, industrial production, consumer price 
index, capacity utilization, unemployment, and housing starts) to a shock by the FFR, and 
subsequently a shock to the shadow rate, and discover that there is indeed a correlation between 
macroeconomic variables, the FFR, and the shadow rate.30  
Furthermore, through the use of simple factor-augmented vector autoregression 
(FAVAR), they plot impulse responses, and ultimately discover they have 90% confidence 
intervals for their data.31 Their model makes use of more advanced regression techniques, as well 
as more raw data, than what is presented in this thesis. Even though Wu and Xia do not focus on 
the credit channel in their work, the variables that they do contrast to the shadow rate appear to 
have a direct correlation, and their work does objectively show that the shadow rate moves in 
direct response to the macrovariables chosen. 
As such, this work does not ultimately disprove that the shadow rate is unrelated to lender 
and borrower variables; this thesis merely shows that in the experiment outlined at the start of 
                                                        
30 Wu, Jing Cynthia, and Fan Dora Xia. "Measuring the Macroeconomic Impact of Monetary Policy at the  
Zero Lower Bound." Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 48.2-3 (2016): 253-91. Web. 9 Nov. 2015.  
 
31 Wu, Jing Cynthia, and Fan Dora Xia. "Measuring the Macroeconomic Impact of Monetary Policy at the  
Zero Lower Bound." Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 48.2-3 (2016): 253-91. Web. 9 Nov. 2015. 
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this work, there does not appear to be any correlation between the variables chosen and the 
shadow rate. 
 In the Formal Analysis section, some of the reasons for this were outlined, however, a 
deeper discussion is warranted. One of the biggest reasons for the unobservable correlation has 
to do with the fact that there are a limited number of observations used in the study. The main 
database used was the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ website, and many of the variables 
used did not come with an option for monthly intervals. As such, even the Wu-Xia (2009) 
shadow rate, which did come on a monthly basis, had to be converted to a quarterly result so that 
it could be accurately used in the regression analysis. 
 The variables picked were also susceptible to changes in factors not related to the shadow 
rate, in fact, as mentioned in the Formal Analysis section, some of the variables (like the S&P 
500) were even moved by non-economic shocks, such as wars, or domestic unrest. The two 
variables that appeared to have the closest relationship with the shadow rate were non-
performing loans to total loans and the CCDI. It is also important to note that these two variables 
were not as susceptible to non-economic factors as something like the S&P 500, and as such 
appeared to be more closely correlated with the shadow rate.  
 This thesis would have benefitted from choosing better regressor variables, and 
undertaking deeper research to seek lender and borrower variables that were more closely tied to 
monetary policy. On the other hand, this thesis is still unique in its approach to attempting to 
relate credit channel variables (those related to lenders and borrowers) and attempting to contrast 
them to the Wu-Xia shadow rate. Thus, despite its shortcomings, the research here can still be 
built upon in the future, albeit with better adjusted models, and better-chosen variables. Although 
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this work did not prove that there exists a direct correlation between lenders, borrowers, and the 
shadow rate, hopefully, it at least raised an interest in the relationship of the credit channel 
variables and the shadow rate, an interest that future academics will explore in their own works.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28 
 
REFERENCES 
 
"Bank Non-Performing Loans to Gross Loans for United States." FRED. Web. 6 Apr. 2016. 
Beltratti, Andrei, and Giovanna Paladino. “Bank Leverage and Profitability: Evidence From a 
Sample of International Banks.” Review of Financial Economics (2015): 46. Academic 
OneFile. Web. 6 April 2016 
Bernanke, Ben. The Courage to Act: A Memoir of a Crisis and Its Aftermath. New York, NY: W.  
W. Norton, 2015. Print.  
Bernanke, Ben S., and Mark Gertler. "Inside the Black Box: The Credit Channel of Monetary  
Policy Transmission." Journal of Economic Perspectives 9.4 (1995): 27-48. Web. 10 
Nov. 2015. 
Campbell, Elizabeth, and Lorraine Woellert. "You Know It's a Tough Market When Bernanke  
Can't Refinance." Bloomberg.com. Bloomberg, 3 Oct. 2014. Web. 20 Mar. 2016.  
Chidley, Joe. “A voice in the wilderness: Paul Krugman on why Economists Misread the  
Financial Crisis and why the US still needs more Stimulus.” Canadian Business 2009: 48.  
Academic OneFile. Web. 10 Feb. 2016. 
Ciccarelli, Matteo, Angela Maddaloni, and Jose-Luis Peydro. “Trusting the Bankers: A New  
Look at the Credit Channel of Monetary Policy.” Review of Economic Dynamis 18.4 
(2015): 979-1002. EconLit. Web. 15 Apr. 2016. 
"Consumer Price Index." Bureau of Labor Statistics. Web. 6 Apr. 2016. 
"Credibility Consumer Distress Index (DISCONTINUED)." FRED. Web. 6 Apr. 2016. 
Gambacorta, Leonardo, and David Marques-Ibanez. "The Bank Lending Channel: Lessons from  
the Crisis." BIS Working Papers (2014). Web. 05 Apr. 2016.  
29 
 
 
Hilsenrath, John. "Fed Sets Stage for Rate Hikes in 2015." Wsj.com. Wall Street Journal. Web.  
10 Feb. 2016.  
Hilsenrath, John. "Fed Cuts Rates Near Zero to Battle Slump." Wsj.com. Wall Street Journal, 17  
Dec. 2008. Web. 04 Nov. 2015.  
Jackson, Laura E. "Monetary Policy in a Zero Lower Bound Environment." University of North  
Carolina Phd Submission (2014): 1-91. Web. 10 Nov. 2016.  
Lombardi, Marco, and Feng Zhu. "A Shadow Policy Rate to Calibrate US Monetary Policy at the  
Zero Lower Bound." BIS Working Papers. Web. 05 Apr. 2016.  
"Nonfinancial Corporate Business; Debt Securities; Liability, Level." FRED. Web. 6 Apr. 2016. 
Sowell, Thomas. Basic Economics: A Common Sense Guide to the Economy. 1st ed. Vol. 5. New  
York: Basic, 2015. Print. 
"S&P 500©." FRED. Web. 6 Apr. 2016. 
Summers, Larry. "The Age of Secular Stagnation: What It Is and What to Do About It." Foreign  
Affairs 95.2 (2016): 2-9. Web. 03 Mar. 2016.  
Xia, Fan. "The Term Structure of Interest Rates, Monetary Policy, and Macroeconomy." Order  
No. 3630527 University of California, San Diego, 2014. Ann Arbor: ProQuest. Web. 10 
Nov. 2015 
Wu, Jing Cynthia, and Fan Dora Xia. "Measuring the Macroeconomic Impact of Monetary 
Policy at the Zero Lower Bound." Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 48.2-3 (2016): 
253-91. Web. 
"What Is Coefficient of Determination (r2)? Definition and Meaning." BusinessDictionary.com.  
Web. 7 Apr. 2016. 
30 
 
 
 
